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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Andrew R. McRoberts *
I. INTRODUCTION
With this article, for the first time, the University of Richmond
Law Review includes a survey of Virginia local government law in
its esteemed Annual Survey of Virginia Law, now celebrating its
twenty-sixth anniversary of publication. This article is intended
to be an "annual" survey and accordingly discusses decisions by
the Supreme Court of Virginia from June 2010 through June
2011 and bills passed by the 2011 Virginia General Assembly,
which affect local government law.
Not every Supreme Court of Virginia case involving local gov-
ernment is discussed. Some cases which have local governments
or their officials as parties do not involve "Virginia local govern-
ment law" in its purest sense but rather real property, contracts,
employment, civil procedure, or some other area of the law in
which the governmental nature of the party is incidental or at
best secondary. Those cases are omitted. Instead, this article in-
cludes cases in which the underlying substance of the law dealt
with topics essential to the operation of government-e.g., taxa-
tion, legislative immunity, adoption of ordinances, and zoning.
Writing a survey of 2011 legislative activity affecting local gov-
ernment law required even more selectivity due to space limita-
tions and the enormous number of local government-related bills.
The 2011 Virginia General Assembly considered 2692 individual
bills or resolutions and passed 1599 of them.' Hundreds of these
* Sands Anderson, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; J.D., 1990, University of Richmond
School of Law; B.A., 1987, College of William & Mary.
The author gratefully acknowledges the significant research and writing assistance of
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1. Virginia General Assembly Division of Legislative Services, Session Statistics,
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?111+oth+STA (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
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directly affected Virginia local government entities and officials
or how citizens deal with them. The large number of local gov-
ernment-related bills is partly due to the significant role that lo-
cal government plays in the lives and commerce of Virginians.
However, a primary reason for the large number of local govern-
ment bills is the strict application of the Dillon Rule in the au-
thority of local governments.2
Under the Dillon Rule, a locality has only the "powers express-
ly granted by statute, those necessarily implied therefrom, and
those that are essential and indispensable to the exercise of those
expressly granted."3 This rule necessarily places the General As-
sembly and the state law at the core of how local governments
work. Counties, cities, and towns must go to the General Assem-
bly frequently for changes in authority or procedure, even if the
changes are minor or non-controversial.4 In addition, citizens,
businesses, and others aggrieved by ordinances, procedures, or
policies at the local government level, or by court decisions in lo-
cal government cases, often attempt to change the statutes on
which they are based by appealing to the state legislature.'
Out of the hundreds of local government bills, this article ad-
dresses a select number of bills that seem to be significant and in-
teresting, or at least the most discussed by local government at-
torneys and officials. Undoubtedly, others could choose a different
list. This article deals with timely topics such as gambling, guns,
fraud, taxation, zoning, and eminent domain. Omitted entirely is
any discussion of the annual budget,6 the largest piece of legisla-
tion from 2011. The budget significantly affects all local govern-
ments but does not typically affect local government law in the
traditional sense.
2. See Deirdre Fernandez, Why Do Virginia Cities Need State Blessing to Act? Blame
This Guy, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 26, 2011, at 3.
3. Advanced Towing Co. v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 280 Va. 187, 193, 694
S.E.2d 621, 624 (2010) (citing Cnty. Bd. v. White, 259 Va. 708, 710 n.1, 712, 528 S.E.2d
706, 707 n.1, 708 (2000); City of Virginia Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 221, 518 S.E.2d 314,
316 (1999); Commonwealth v. Cnty. Bd., 217 Va. 558, 573-74, 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (1977)).
4. See Fernandez, supra note 2.
5. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2286-87
(2003); Louis V. Csoka, The Dream of Greater Municipal Autonomy: Should the Legislature
of the Courts Modify Dillon's Rule, A Common Law Restraint on Municipal Power?, 29
N.C. CENT. L. REV. 194, 209-10 (2007).
6. 2011 Appropriation Act of May 2, 2011, ch. 890, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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II. CASE LAw SUMMARIES
Selected opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia in the area
of local government law from June 2010 through June 2011 are
discussed below.
A. Taxation
1. Riverside Owner, L.L.C. v. City of Richmond'
The Riverside Owner, L.L.C. case involved the appropriate
amount for a tax exemption earned by a developer under Virginia
Code section 58.1-3221 and Richmond City Code section 27-83.8
These laws provided for a partial exemption of the real estate
taxes under the City's Tax Abatement Program for Rehabilitated
Real Estate.? Qualifying properties earned an exemption under
the ordinance if the "assessment" of the rehabilitated property in-
creases by 40% after rehabilitation.o
Under the facts of the case, Richmond Power Plant, L.L.C. de-
veloped a site located on Brown's Island, which was originally
valued at $500." After significant rehabilitation and develop-
ment, the mixed-use property was subsequently sold to Riverside
Owner, L.L.C.12 At issue was the proper amount of the tax ex-
emption.1 3
Rather than use the property's actual assessment after rehabil-
itation, the staff had applied its longstanding Chandler policy to
calculate the exemption, using only the part of the assessment
due to the rehabilitation.14 The purpose and effect of the Chandler
policy was "to eliminate from the final estimate of value any en-
hancement created by something other than rehabilitation or
physical improvement."" The City Assessor assessed the rehabili-
tated offices after rehabilitation for real estate tax purposes at
7. 282 Va. 62, 711 S.E.2d 553 (2011).
8. Id. at 65, 711 S.E.2d at 534-35.
9. Id. at 65, 69-70, 711 S.E.2d at 534-35, 537.
10. Id. at 65, 711 S.E.2d at 534-35.
11. Id. at 66, 711 S.E.2d at 535.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 65, 711 S.E.2d at 534-35.
14. Id. at 66-67, 711 S.E.2d at 535.
15. Id. at 66, 711 S.E.2d at 535 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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$63.8 million.1 6 However, in applying the Chandler policy, the
City staff only awarded an exemption to Riverside Owner, L.L.C.
in the amount of $45.2 million, rather than the actual assessment
of the offices.1 7
Riverside Owner, L.L.C. sued for erroneous assessment under
Virginia Code section 58.1-3984 due to the lower-than-expected
exemption." The Richmond Circuit Court agreed with Riverside
Owner, L.L.C., holding in a letter opinion that the Chandler poli-
cy departed from the statutory and ordinance requirements for
the exemption program because it "relie[d] on values other than
assessed ones" to determine the amount of the exemption. 19
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned that the
City Council, not the staff, had the authority to set the criteria for
the exemption program, 20 and the language of the City ordinance
required that a partial exemption be based on the "first assessed
value of the rehabilitation."2 1 The relevant assessed value is the
first fair market value "assessment" after the rehabilitation (in
this case $63.8 million), which the court reasoned had a statutory
and well-settled meaning.2 2 Therefore, the court held that the
amount calculated under the Chandler policy, $45.2 million, was
far less than the City's "assessment" of $63.8 million, which Vir-
ginia Code section 58.1-3221 and Richmond City Code section 27-
83 require be used.2 3
While the intent of the statute and the ordinance may (or may
not) have been precisely what the Chandler policy did, the City
staff was limited by the plain meaning of the law and therefore
forced to use the full "assessment" in granting the tax exemp-
tion.24
16. Id.
17. Id. at 66-67, 711 S.E.2d at 535.
18. Id. at 67, 711 S.E.2d at 535-36.
19. Id. at 67-68, 711 S.E.2d at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id. at 71-72, 711 S.E.2d at 538.
21. Id. at 71, 711 S.E.2d at 538.
22. Id.




2. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Chesterfield County25
The court ruled in favor of petitioner Ford Motor Credit Com-
pany's ("FMCC") application for a refund of over $1 million in
Business, Professional, and Occupational License ("BPOL") taxes
levied by Chesterfield County pursuant to Virginia Code sections
58.1-3702 and -3703(A).26 Under Virginia Code section 58.1-
3703.1(A), a locality may only levy taxes upon a licensee when
their services are performed at "a definite place of business" with-
in that locality.2 7 The issues presented on appeal were: (i) wheth-
er "gross receipts" from loans originating from the County Branch
of FMCC's nationwide automobile installment and inventory fi-
nancing operations could be attributable to services outside the
County, and (ii) whether it was "'impractical [or] impossible' to
attribute the gross receipts to the performance of services at a
specific, definite place of business."28 The court held the taxes
were not permitted by the statute because FMCC's financing op-
erations were conducted across multiple, albeit dependent offices;
therefore, "the operations of the [County] Branch did not produce
100% of the gross receipts that the County taxed."2 9
This decision may affect the tax liability of any corporation
whose revenue generating operations span across multiple locali-
ties, and whose revenue streams may not be attributed directly to
any single office. However, the court's holding depends on the
specific facts of the case; and therefore, applications of the case
may be limited to very similar fact patterns.
3. TB Venture, L.L.C. v. Arlington County3 0
At issue in the TB Venture case was whether a twenty-one unit
block of condominiums could be assessed on a pro-rata basis by
allocating or dividing the value of the whole block into a number
of individual units, rather than having each unit assessed indi-
vidually.3 1 TB Venture argued they were unable to fairly deter-
25. 281 Va. 321, 707 S.E.2d 311 (2011).
26. Id. at 325-26, 707 S.E.2d at 313.
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
28. Ford Motor Credit Co., 281 Va. at 337, 707 S.E.2d at 319.
29. Id. at 339-40, 707 S.E.2d at 321.
30. 280 Va. 558, 701 S.E.2d 791 (2010).
31. Id. at 558, 560, 562, 564, 701 S.E.2d at 791, 792-94.
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mine the market value of each unit on a fee simple basis, as is re-
quired by law, because the apartments were subject to a forty-
year covenant restricting the property to rent-only. 32 In the words
of TB Venture's expert: "There is no market for [a] 'one rent-
restricted unit as an investment."' 3 3 However, Virginia law re-
quires that "[a]ll assessments of real estate . . . shall be at their
fair market value," and when disputing a property value assess-
ment, "a taxpayer must necessarily establish the property's fair
market value."3 4 The court found TB Venture's assessment meth-
odology inadequate to determine the fair market value and af-
firmed the circuit court's decision to strike TB Venture's evi-
dence.3 5
While the decision was much discussed in the real estate com-
munity, this opinion merely followed (and frequently cited) the
2008 Supreme Court of Virginia decision in West Creek Associ-
ates, L.L.C. v. County of Goochland.3 6 The two cases involve the
same basic point of assessment law. Both cases held that each
taxable parcel or unit of real estate (a tax parcel in West Creek
and a condominium unit in TB Venture) must be assessed at its
individual fair market value, not as a collection of taxable units (a
business parcel in West Creek and a building in TB Venture).37
Perhaps understandably, the taxpayers in each of these cases
sought to lower their assessed value by using a collective or
32. Id. at 561-62, 701 S.E.2d at 793.
33. Id.
34. VA. CONST. art. X, §H 1-2; TB Venture, 280 Va. at 563, 701 S.E.2d at 794; West
Creek Assocs., L.L.C. v. Cnty. of Goochland, 276 Va. 393, 417, 665 S.E.2d 834, 847 (2008);
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3201. (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
35. TB Venture, 280 Va. at 564-65, 701 S.E.2d at 794-95.
36. Id. at 563-65, 701 S.E.2d at 794-95; West Creek, 276 Va. at 393, 665 S.E.2d at
834. The author was the Goochland County Attorney from 2001 to 2009 and counsel
in these consolidated cases, related cases, and predecessor cases. All told, the collec-
tive litigation lasted for over eight years. See Amy Condra, Va. Supreme Court Upholds
County Assessments, GOOCHLAND GAZETTE, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.goochlandgazet
te.com/index.php/news/article/va-supremecourtupholdscountys-tax-assessments/; An-
drew McRoberts, West Creek Associates v. County of Goochland, Part One, VA. LOCALITY
LAW (Aug. 7, 2009, 10:53 AM), http://valocalitylaw.com/2009/08/07/west-creek-associates-
v-county-of-goochland-part-one/; Andrew McRoberts, West Creek Associates v. County
of Goochland Part Two, VA. LOcALITY LAW (Aug. 11, 2009, 3:45 AM), http://valocality
law.com/2009/08/11/west-creek-associates-11c-v-county-of-goochland-part-two/; Andrew Mc-
Roberts, West Creek Associates, LLC v. County of Goochland, Part Three, VA. LOCALITY
LAW (Aug. 14, 2009, 10:05 AM), http://valocalitylaw.com/2009/08/14/west-creek-associates-
llc-v-county-of-goochland-part-three/.
37. TB Venture, 280 Va. at 564, 701 S.E.2d at 794; West Creek, 276 Va. at 414-15 n.8,
665 S.E.2d at 845-46 n.8.
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wholesale valuation methodology. 8 However, these two opinions
make clear that Virginia law does not allow a collective or whole-
sale valuation and then allocation or division of that valuation for
assessment purposes.
4. County of Albemarle v. Keswick Club, L.P. 3
In County of Albemarle v. Keswick Club L.P. (Keswick II), the
supreme court was petitioned to determine whether the taxpayer
had met its burden of proof on remand after the court held in
Keswick I that an assessor had failed to consider, and properly re-
ject, alternate valuation methodologies. 40 Experts on both sides
testified to the value of the property and described the methodol-
ogies they used to achieve their results.4 The court deferred to
the circuit court's judgment regarding the weight and credibility
given to each expert witness and affirmed its factual valuation of
the property.4 2 In the court's majority opinion, the evidence pre-
sented by the taxpayer was sufficient to demonstrate that the as-
sessed value of the property exceeded the fair market value re-
quired by law.43
In her dissent, Justice Kinser asserted that the circuit court
erred, because: (i) the lower court misinterpreted the Keswick I
holding by equating erroneousness with a failure to consider and
properly reject alternate valuation methods, and (ii) the taxpayer
failed to meet its burden to prove that the assessment was erro-
neous. 4 4 She reasoned that the circuit court could not have found
the assessment erroneous after rejecting the testimony of the
taxpayer's valuation expert at trial.45 Without such evidence, ac-
cording to Justice Kinser, it was error to conclude that "Keswick
[Club's] evidence concerning the value of the property was suffi-
38. TB Venture, 280 Va. at 561-62, 701 S.E.2d at 793; West Creek, 276 Va. at 600, 665
S.E.2d at 837.
39. 280 Va. 381, 699 S.E.2d 491 (2010).
40. Id. at 383-84, 699 S.E.2d at 492; Keswick Club, L.P. v. Cnty. of Albemarle (Kes-
wick I), 273 Va. 128, 140, 639 S.E.2d 243, 250 (2007).
41. Keswick II, 280 Va. at 384-85, 699 S.E.2d at 492-93.
42. Id. at 388, 699 S.E.2d at 495.
43. Id. at 388-90, 699 S.E.2d at 495-96.
44. Id. at 390-91, 699 S.E.2d at 496 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 394, 699 S.E.2d at 498.
1812011]
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cient to demonstrate that the County's assessment exceeded fair
market value."4
Importantly, this opinion is one of the few Supreme Court of
Virginia cases dealing with the question of what happens after a
court finds that an assessor has failed to consider, and properly
reject, alternate valuation methods. After a court finds such a
"failure" occurred, what is the burden of the taxpayer? Important-
ly, such a "failure" does not, in and of itself, mean that the valua-
tion is erroneous. The court did not hold in either Keswick case
that merely failing to consider and properly reject alternate valu-
ation methods was itself error but rather held it to be a "fail-
ure."4 7 There are plenty of Supreme Court of Virginia cases de-
scribing what happens after "manifest error."4 But what happens
after this sort of "failure"? The taxpayer must still prove the as-
sessment is erroneous.4 9 The Keswick II case turned on the issue
of whether the taxpayer bore its burden of proving the erroneous-
ness of the value. 0 The majority held that the taxpayer's evidence
presented by the club manager was sufficient to prove the errone-
ousness of the valuation; given the lower court's rejection of the
taxpayer's expert, Justice Kinser strongly disagreed."
5. FFW Enterprises v. Fairfax County52
The underlying issue in FFW Enterprises is the constitutionali-
ty of a statute levying a tax upon commercial and industrial
property to fund the Dulles "Metrorail" extension project. FFW,
a business subject to the tax, complained the tax was unconstitu-
46. Id. at 394, 699 S.E.2d at 498 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. at 387-88, 699 S.E.2d at 494-95 (majority opinion); Keswick I, 273 Va. at 140,
639 S.E.2d at 250.
48. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Telecomm. Indus., 246 Va. 472, 476, 436 S.E.2d 442,
444 (1993) ("If the trial court finds that a manifest error in the assessment exists, it may
properly find the presumption rebutted and fix the fair market value of the property in
accordance with the evidence."). For the Virginia Code section that provides the action of
the court see VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3987 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
49. See Bd. of Supervisors v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 260 Va. 317, 329-30, 535
S.E.2d 163, 169-70 (2000) (ruling for the taxpayer, the court went on to hold that errone-
ousness was also proven).
50. Keswick II, 280 Va. at 387-88, 699 S.E.2d at 494-95.
51. See generally id. at 390-95, 699 S.E.2d at 496-99 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (chal-
lenging the rationale of the majority in determining whether the assessed value exceeded
the property's fair market value).
52. 280 Va. 583, 701 S.E.2d 795 (2010).
53. Id. at 586, 589, 701 S.E.2d at 797, 799.
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tional because article X of the Virginia Constitution "requires the
General Assembly to treat all real property within a given juris-
diction as a single indivisible class for purposes of taxation."5 4
They argued the General Assembly possessed no power to create
tax classifications for certain types of real property, and even if
they did, these classifications lacked no "reasonable basis."5
The court disagreed with FFW. First, the Virginia Constitution
grants the General Assembly the express authority to create sep-
arate tax classifications.5 6 Second, there was a "reasonable basis"
behind the classification, namely the disproportionate benefit
that commercial and industrial properties would derive from the
project, which provided the uniformity required by article X, sec-
tion 1 of the Virginia Constitution." FFW argued that there ex-
isted no "reasonable basis" because the taxes "by their terms, col-
lect revenues for the purpose of funding transportation improve-
improvements that either benefit the entire taxing locality or the
general public as a whole."" FFW cited the City of Hampton v.
Insurance Co. of North America, in which a tax on fire insurance
providers used solely to fund a fireman's relief fund was ruled un-
constitutional. 5 9 The transportation tax was constitutional be-
cause, unlike the tax in Insurance Co. of North America, the bene-
ficiary class is much larger and multiple justifications were
offered by the County.60
This opinion is significant, because it confirms the discretion
given to state and local governments when classifying for taxa-
tion purposes." Also, special taxes such as the one mentioned
above are becoming ever more critical in today's society due to the
lack of state funding allocated for large-scale transportation and
development projects.
54. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1; 280 Va. at 589-90, 701 S.E.2d at 799.
55. 280 Va. at 589-90, 701 S.E.2d at 799.
56. Id. at 592, 701 S.E.2d at 801.
57. Id. at 587, 701 S.E.2d at 798.
58. Id. at 594-95, 701 S.E.2d at 802.
59. Id. at 595, 701 S.E.2d at 795, 802; see City of Hampton v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 177
Va. 494, 496, 508, 14 S.E.2d 396, 396, 401 (1941).
60. FFWEnterp., 280 Va. at 596, 701 S.E.2d at 803.
61. Nageotte v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 09053, slip op. at 1, 3 (Va. Nov. 4, 2010) (ap-
plying FFW Enterprises to a locality's service district ordinance adopted pursuant to VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-2403 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
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B. Legislative Immunity-Defamation: Isle of Wight County v.
Nogiec6 2
Nogiec, a former employee of Isle of Wight County, brought suit
against the County for breach of a severance contract and against
the assistant administrator individually for defamation after dis-
paraging remarks were made concerning Nogiec's failure to act in
response to warnings about flooding at a local museum." Two is-
sues were raised on appeal. The first issue was whether Nogiec
met "his burden of proving with reasonable certainty the damag-
es that resulted from [the breach of contract]."64 Nogiec's failure
to present any evidence showing that he lost job opportunities be-
cause of the disparaging remarks meant he could not prove "with
reasonable certainty the damages that resulted from its breach."65
As a result, the court ruled that the "circuit court erred in deny-
ing the County's motions to strike and set aside the verdict on
that claim."6
The second issue on appeal addressed whether the disparaging
remarks made by an assistant administrator to a member of a
county board of supervisors during an official meeting are pro-
tected by an absolute privilege.6 7 Although statements made dur-
ing legislative session may be absolutely privileged, in this case of
first impression, the court held that absolute privilege only ap-
plies when the statements are made during the "creation of legis-
lation."" The court found insufficient evidence to prove that these
statements were made in that context and affirmed the circuit
court's ruling denying the County's motion to strike the defama-
tion claim.6 9
This case is significant, because it limits the privilege entitled
to county officials, employees, and perhaps the public when
speaking at board meetings. Remarks made during session but
outside of the legislative context are now no longer entitled to ab-
62. 281 Va. 140, 704 S.E.2d 83 (2011).
63. Id. at 144-45, 704 S.E.2d at 84-85.
64. Id. at 144, 150, 704 S.E.2d at 84, 87.
65. Id. at 150, 704 S.E.2d at 87.
66. Id. at 151, 704 S.E.2d at 88.
67. Id. at 144, 153, 704 S.E.2d at 84, 89.
68. Id. at 153, 155, 704 S.E.2d at 89-90.
69. Id. at 155, 704 S.E.2d at 90.
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solute privilege protection." It is important to note the court
passed on deciding the secondary issue of whether county boards
are even legislative bodies that may invoke absolute privilege in
the first place." A challenge on this issue is likely to occur in the
future.
In the author's opinion, it will be difficult for courts to parse
the intermingled roles of local governing bodies and to determine
where a legislative role starts and stops. Based on this author's
experience, rarely is a local governing body completely outside of
a legislative role as any agenda item could potentially result in
the initiation of an ordinance amendment. Most questions asked
by an elected official could be a starting point for a referral for
legislative drafting to staff or for the planning commission. As a
practice point, this case magnifies the need to introduce evidence
of the parameters of the legislative role of the governing body
when raising an immunity defense to defamation.
C. Ordinances-"Fairly Debatable Standard" Town of Leesburg
v. Giordano7 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling in Giordano addressed
the sufficiency of evidence necessary to challenge the "fairly de-
batable" standard used to measure the reasonableness of a local
legislative action.7 3 Complainants in this case were a group of
out-of-town Loudon County residents whose water and sewage
utilities were supplied by the Town of Leesburg." In response to a
rate study performed by a private utility pricing service, the
Town passed an ordinance in response to a "cost of service" study
performed by a private utility pricing service that charged out-of-
town customers a 100% surcharge on their water and sewage.7
70. Id. at 154, 704 S.E.2d at 89 ("We therefore believe that application of the privilege
should be limited to proceedings before a legislative body in which the public interest in
free speech outweighs the potential harm to an individual's reputation.").
71. Id. at 155, 704 S.E.2d at 90.
72. 280 Va. 597, 701 S.E.2d 783 (2010). The author co-wrote the amicus brief filed in
this case on behalf of the Virginia Municipal League supporting the application of the fair-
ly debatable standard to review the reasonableness of a locality's utility rate ordinance.
See Brief for Virginia Municipal League as Amicus Curae Supporting Appellants, Town of
Leesburg v. Giordano, 280 Va. 597, 701 S.E.2d 783 (2010) (Nos. 091455, 092329), 2010 WL
5795225.
73. 280 Va. at 599, 701 S.E.2d at 784.
74. Id. at 599-600, 701 S.E.2d at 784.
75. Id. at 600, 701 S.E.2d at 784.
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The issue presented was whether the Town put forth "some evi-
dence of reasonableness" to support the legislative action and to
satisfy the "fairly debatable" standard.7 6 The setting of water and
sewage rates is a non-delegable legislative function and enjoys a
presumption of validity, so the governing body needs only to prof-
fer "any evidence in the record sufficiently probative to make a
fairly debatable issue."" Complainant's expert presented compel-
ling evidence showing the increased rates were unreasonable, but
the Town was only required to present minimal proof of reasona-
bleness." Evidence from the Town supporting reasonableness in-
cluded an opinion of reasonableness from one of its experts, and
testimony that most localities serving customers out of its bound-
ary have a rate differential-many of which are in excess of the
Town's 100% rate differential."
Senior Justice Russell, in a spirited dissent, raised the interest-
ing issue of whether the "fairly debatable" standard should even
apply to legislative acts imposed upon constituents outside of the
governing body's jurisdiction." Senior Justice Russell's dissent,
joined by newly appointed Justice Mims, asserted that if the "fair-
ly debatable" standard were to apply in this situation, "the out-of-
town customers are left to the mercies of an unregulated monopo-
ly against which they have no redress at the polls or in the
courts."s" Senior Justice Russell suggested a preponderance of the
evidence standard instead.8 2
D. Constitutional Challenges to Ordinances
1. Advanced Towing Co. v. Board of Supervisors"
The court was asked to address the legality of a Fairfax County
ordinance requiring towing companies to store towed vehicles
within the county limits." Advanced Towing and several other
76. Id. at 605, 701 S.E.2d at 787.
77. Id. at 605-06, 608, 701 S.E.2d at 787, 789 (citing Bd. of Supervisors v. Stickley,
263 Va. 1, 11, 556 S.E.2d 748, 754 (2002)).
78. Id. at 601-05, 607, 701 S.E.2d at 785-88.
79. Id. at 603-04, 701 S.E.2d at 786-87.
80. Id. at 608-09, 701 S.E.2d at 789-90 (Russell, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 610, 701 S.E.2d at 790.
82. Id. at 611, 701 S.E.2d at 790.
83. 280 Va. 187, 694 S.E.2d 621 (2010).
84. Id. at 189-90, 694 S.E.2d at 622-23.
186 [Vol. 46:175
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
towing companies argued that the ordinance violated their equal
protection rights guaranteed under both the Virginia and United
States Constitutions, and that the ordinance exceeded the scope
of power allowed to municipal corporations under the Dillon
Rule."
Applying the rational basis test, the court held the ordinance
did not violate the towing company's equal protection rights be-
cause the Board of Supervisors offered sufficient justification for
the ordinance." The ordinance in question contained several pro-
visions requiring towing facilities to take steps to protect the
safety of the vehicles they tow." These provisions were not appli-
cable to towing facilities outside the county line, so keeping the
vehicles within the county was the only way to enforce the ordi-
nance.8 ' Responding to petitioner's Dillon Rule argument, the
court found the municipality's right to regulate towing under Vir-
ginia Code section 46.2-1232(A) necessarily implies the power to
prescribe the location where the vehicles are stored." Under the
Dillon Rule, "municipal corporations have only those powers ex-
pressly granted to them by statute,"9 0 but local governments are
permitted to "exercise discretionary authority when a statutory
grant is expressly made but is silent upon the mode or manner of
its execution."" The statute granting the county the power to
regulate towing is silent on storage, but prescribing the manner
in which vehicles are stored is necessary to exercising the general
regulatory power.9 2
2. Covel v. Town of Vienna"
Petitioners challenged the circuit court's ruling in three consol-
idated cases concerning the validity of two town ordinances: Vi-
enna Town Code sections 18-258 through 18-280 ("Historic Dis-
tricts Ordinance") and Vienna Town Code sections 18-280.1
85. Id. at 190, 694 S.E.2d at 623.
86. See id. at 192, 694 S.E.2d at 624.
87. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 622-23.
88. See id. at 191-92, 694 S.E.2d at 622-24.
89. Id. at 193, 694 S.E.2d at 625.
90. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 624.
91. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Arlington Cnty. Bd., 217 Va. 558, 574-75, 232 S.E.2d
30, 40-41 (1977)).
92. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1232 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
93. 280 Va. 151, 694 S.E.2d 609 (2010).
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through 18-280.13 ("Windover Heights Historic District Ordi-
nance" or "WHHD Ordinance").9 4 Petitioners filed suit after the
Town refused Michael Covel's certificate of appropriateness re-
quest to erect a fence on his property and subsequently refused
Covel's and other landowners' requests to remove their parcels
from the Windover Heights Historic District.9 5 Specifically, peti-
tioners argued that: "(a) the WHHD Ordinance was unconstitu-
tionally vague, (b) the Historic Districts Ordinance was enacted
in violation of Code § 15.2-2306, and (c) the WHHD Ordinance
was enacted in violation of [Code] § 18-261.""
The court affirmed the circuit court's decisions for three rea-
sons.97 First, the WHHD Ordinance did not violate Virginia Code
section 15.2-2306, because the plain language of the statute al-
lows "localities to create historic districts without landmarks,
buildings, or structures."9 8 Therefore, petitioners' argument that
the statute required the presence of a historic building to qualify
was unfounded.9 9 Second, petitioners could not attack the adop-
tion of Vienna Town Code section 18-261, because the ordinance
was adopted before Virginia Code section 15.2-1427(C), which ex-
pressly precludes all non-constitutional challenges to the adop-
tion of all previously adopted ordinances.o Finally, the constitu-
tional vagueness argument failed, because neither Michael Covel
nor the other petitioners objected to the circuit court's dismissal
of the vagueness claim incorporated in its consolidation order.'
Also, Covel lacked standing to challenge the ordinance on consti-
tutional grounds, because he failed to follow the appropriate pro-
cedure required for petitioning the Town to erect the fence.10 2
94. Id. at 154, 694 S.E.2d at 611.
95. Id. at 155-56, 694 S.E.2d at 612.
96. Id. at 155, 694 S.E.2d at 612.
97. Id. at 165, 694 S.E.2d at 618.
98. Id. at 160, 694 S.E.2d at 615; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2306 (Repl. Vol. 2008
& Cum. Supp. 2011).
99. Covel, 280 Va. at 160, 694 S.E.2d at 615.
100. Id. at 160-61, 694 S.E.2d at 615; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1427(C) (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
101. Covel, 280 Va. at 162-63, 694 S.E.2d at 616.
102. Id. at 163, 694 S.E.2d at 616.
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E. Civil Procedure: Davis v. County of Fairfax"o'
The court in Davis was asked to address whether an animal
case appealed to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County and subse-
quently nonsuited must be re-filed in the circuit court.'0 o Davis
appealed a district court's decision declaring her an unfit pet
owner to circuit court.o' The County filed a motion to nonsuit the
case in circuit court and thereafter filed a second petition to the
district court pursuant to the predecessor to Virginia Code section
3.2-6569.106 When the general district court ruled that it lacked
jurisdiction because of the original appeal, the County appealed
to circuit court again.o' The circuit court held a trial and also
found Davis to be an unfit pet owner.' Davis appealed, arguing
that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction be-
cause the case should have been re-filed in the circuit court after
the original non-suit.'0 9 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed
and dismissed the $51,504.64 fine against Davis."0
Virginia Code section 8.01-380(A) states that, "[a]fter a nonsuit
no new proceeding on the same cause of action or against the
same party shall be had in any court other than that in which the
nonsuit was taken, unless that court is without jurisdiction or not
a proper venue, or other good cause is shown.""' Although the
County was correct that the general district court had original ju-
risdiction over unfit owner cases, after the matter had been ap-
pealed to circuit court for the first time, its jurisdiction was trans-
ferred to the circuit court by way of the original appeal." 2 The
circuit court's jurisdiction on appeal from the general district
court is derivative of the lower court's." Therefore, since general
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the second suit
103. 282 Va. 23, 710 S.E.2d 466 (2011).
104. Id. at 26, 710 S.E.2d at 467.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 26-27, 710 S.E.2d at 467; see Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 860, 2008 Va. Acts
2251, 2458-60 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6569 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum.
Supp. 2011)).
107. 282 Va. at 26-27, 710 S.E.2d at 467.
108. Id. at 27, 710 S.E.2d at 467.
109. Id. at 27-29, 710 S.E.2d at 467-69.
110. Id. at 27, 29, 32, 710 S.E.2d at 467, 469-70.
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
112. Davis, 282 Va. at 29-30, 710 S.E.2d at 468-69.
113. Id. at 30, 710 S.E.2d at 469.
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filed by the County, the fine levied by the circuit court against
Davis was also invalid for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.11 4
Although a specific procedural statute was at issue here, this
case is an important reminder of the derivative nature of appel-
late jurisdiction. Another issue, unaddressed by the court, is
whether the non-suit and re-filing in the circuit court was per-
missible at all. This second issue does not appear to have been as-
signed as error. The Supreme Court of Virginia has held, in the
context of an appeal to a circuit court from a board of zoning ap-
peals, that "[Virginia] Code § 8.01-380 applies to trial, not appel-
late, proceedings."1 '
F. Zoning
1. Arogas v. Board of Zoning Appeals"'
In this appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to de-
termine whether an amended proffer for the zoning of real prop-
erty made after a public hearing was enforceable."' Virginia Code
section 15.2-2285(C) states, "[b]efore approving and adopting any
zoning ordinance or amendment thereof, the governing body shall
hold at least one public hearing thereon . . . after which the gov-
erning body may make appropriate changes or corrections in the
ordinance or proposed amendment."" The plain language of the
statute makes clear that no additional meeting or hearing is re-
quired after an initial hearing is held on the matter, and the
Board of Supervisors is entitled to make any subsequent amend-
ments. 119
In 2006, subsequent to the public hearing at issue, the General
Assembly amended Virginia Code sections 15.2-2297, 15.2-2298,
and 15.2-2303, which added the language: "The governing body
may also accept amended proffers once the public hearing has be-
gun if the amended proffers do not materially affect the overall
114. Id. at 31-32, 710 S.E.2d at 470.
115. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Bd. of Supervisors, 275 Va. 452, 459, 657 S.E.2d 147, 150
(2008).
116. 280 Va. 221, 698 S.E.2d 908 (2010).
117. Id. at 223, 698 S.E.2d at 909.




proposal."l2 0 Interestingly, since the Arogas opinion allows for
post-hearing amendments under section 15.2-2285(C),1 2 1 the "if'
clause contained in the 2006 amendment may have the unintend-
ed effect of limiting a governing body's power to accept amended
proffers.
2. James v. City of Falls Church..
Petitioners appealed a planning commission's denial of an ap-
plication requesting to consolidate seven contiguous lots into a
single larger lot.1 23 The trial court struck petitioners' evidence at
the conclusion of their case, because they failed to show the plan-
ning commission's refusal to approve the proposed consolidation
was neither based on the applicable ordinances nor arbitrary and
capricious.12 The "primary issue" presented on appeal, however,
was whether the planning commission was bound under Virginia
Code section 15.2-2311(C) by the zoning administrator's letter
approving of consolidation.12 5 Virginia Code section 15.2-2311(C)
is a statutory exception to the prevailing rule that estoppel does
not apply to local government when acting in a governmental ca-
pacity.126
The court held that Virginia Code section 15.2-2311(C) did not
restrain the discretion of the planning commission.'"' First, the
court held that, by its terms, Virginia Code section 15.2-2311(C)
only limits the subsequent actions of the "'zoning administrator
or other administrative officer,"' a singular term, when a plan-
ning commission contains many officials. 128 The court then noted
that the "administrative officer" referred to here administers or
120. See Act of Mar. 31, 2006, ch. 450, 2006 Va. Acts, 570, 570-73 (codified as amended
at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2297, -2298, -2303(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
121. 280 Va. at 228-29, 688 S.E.2d at 912.
122. 280 Va. 31, 694 S.E.2d 568 (2010).
123. Id. at 34, 36, 694 S.E.2d at 569-70.
124. Id. at 37, 694 S.E.2d at 571.
125. Id. at 42, 694 S.E.2d at 574.
126. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2311(C) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011); Wolfe v.
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 260 Va. 7, 18, 532 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2000) (citing Westminster-
Canterbury v. City of Va. Beach, 238 Va. 493, 503, 385 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1989); Gwinn v.
Alward, 235 Va. 616, 621, 369 S.E.2d 410, 413 (1988)).
127. James, 280 Va. at 43, 45, 694 S.E.2d at 574, 576.
128. Id. at 43, 694 S.E.2d at 575 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2212) (Repl. Vol. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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enforces article 7 (Zoning) of title 15.2 of the Virginia Code. 129 In
contrast, a planning commission exercises authority under article
2 (Planning Commission) of title 15.2.130 Thus, the court held, "the
Planning Commission cannot be an 'administrative officer"' under
Virginia Code section 15.2-2311(C).13 1 In addition, the court held
that the zoning administrator's approval of consolidation was a
"zoning interpretation" and not a "written order, requirement, de-
cision or determination" under the meaning of Virginia Code sec-
tion 15.2-2311(C). 13 2 This case, along with the other recent cases
strictly applying Virginia Code section 15.2-2311(C), 13 3 signal the
court's unwillingness to apply this narrow statutory exception to
the "no estoppel" rule beyond the express terms of the statute.
III. LEGISLATIVE SUMMARIES
The 2011 Virginia General Assembly passed a large number of
bills that affect the practice of local government law in Virginia.
What follows are some of the most significant, interesting, or
simply talked-about bills or resolutions adopted this year.
A. Gambling: House Bill 1584134
This bill was enacted to clarify the rules regulating illegal
gambling within Virginia, after significant concerns were raised
by many Virginia Commonwealth Attorneys and others about so-
called "free spin" internet gambling.'3 5 In 2010, the Virginia At-
torney General issued two opinions addressing the subject under
the former law. The opinion first approved the practice as legal,
and the second opinion, under a different set of facts, found that
it might be illegal.'3 6 Given this uncertainty, the Virginia General
129. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 575.
130. Id. at 43-44, 694 S.E.2d at 575.
131. Id. at 44, 694 S.E.2d at 575 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2311(C) (Repl. Vol. 2008
& Cum. Supp. 2011)).
132. Id., 568 S.E.2d at 575 (citing Bd. of Supervisors v. Crucible, Inc., 278 Va. 152,
160-61 & n.2, 677 S.E.2d 283, 287-88 & n.2 (2009)).
133. See, e.g., Crucible, Inc., 278 Va. at 161, 677 S.E.2d at 287-88; Goyonaga v. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals, 275 Va. 232, 244, 657 S.E.2d 153, 160 (2008).
134. Act of Apr. 29, 2011, ch. 879, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-325 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
135. See id.
136. Compare 2010 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. to Hon. Bill Janis (July 30, 2010) (explaining
that no illegal gambling occurs when the element of consideration is missing), with 2010
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Assembly was asked to clarify the law regarding "free spin" in-
ternet gambling.
The bill expands the definition of what constitutes "considera-
tion" under the gambling statute, Virginia Code section 18.2-325.
The definition was expanded to include "a product, Internet ac-
cess, or other thing" for which a person receives "free points or
other measureable units" that may be used to gamble and subse-
quently redeemed for actual money.1 37 Also, the bill expands the
definition of a "[g]ambling device" to include any "electronic or
video versions" of instruments that may be used to gamble.13 8
Gambling enterprises can no longer allow the opportunity to win
actual money through the risking of "free" points procured
through the purchase of other points or a product or service (e.g.,
phone card, internet access, DVD rental) that, in and of itself,
would not justify the purchase.1 39 The bill also repeals Virginia
Code section 18.2-325.1, which was effective July 1, 2010, and
made "free spin" internet gaming permissible but led to many
concerns. 4 0 This bill provides important clarity for local law en-
forcement officials and local governing bodies faced with com-
plaints.
B. Pneumatic Guns: Senate Bill 757141
This bill broadens rights to fire pneumatic guns, which use air
to fire a projectile, on private property so long as reasonable care
is taken.'4 2 The bill expressly forbids localities from enacting or-
dinances that restrict the use of these weapons outside of desig-
nated shooting areas.'4 3 Now, a landowner may fire pneumatic
weapons on his own property so long as he does so without
threatening the safety of his neighbors.'4 4 Shooters must "take
Op. Va. Att'y Gen. to Hon. R. Edward Houck (Oct. 15, 2010) (explaining that whether a
scenario is illegal "gambling" is fact-dependent, and the scenario presented would consti-
tute illegal gambling because the elements of prize, chance, and consideration are pre-
sent).




141. Act of Apr. 6, 2011, ch. 757, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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reasonable care to prevent the projectile from crossing the bounds
of the property." 145 This bill significantly limits the authority of
local governments under Virginia Code section 15.2-915.4(A) and
allows the discharge of these guns anywhere on private property
with the permission of the owner-even in dense areas within cit-
ies, near property boundaries, or within a small condominium
unit. Some have asked whether the lack of an exception for dense
areas makes any sense, 1 46 or if the bill's "reasonable care" re-
quirement is enforceable, as a practical matter, before an accident
has occurred.14 7 There is no question that it extends private guns
rights and reduces local government regulation of these activities.
C. Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act
1. A Waiver of Sovereign Immunity: House Bill 1399148
This bill, patroned by Delegate Bill Janis, waives sovereign
immunity for claims brought under the Virginia Fraud Against
Taxpayer's Act ("VFATA"), Virginia Code sections 8.01-261.1, et
seq.14 9 The bill's Fiscal Impact Statement explains the intent of
the bill:
[T]he language in the [VFATA] be changed to contain an explicit
waiver of sovereign immunity so that an employee of the Common-
wealth, its agencies, or any political subdivision can create a cause of
action against its employer if an adverse employment action is taken
against the employee by his employer because the employee has op-
posed any practice by his employer prohibited by [§ 8.01-261.3 of the
Act] or participated in an investigation, action, or hearing under the
Act. 15 0
145. Id.
146. See Dan Casey, Tuesday's Column: Not Your Grandfather's BB Gun, ROANOKE
TIMES (July 4, 2011, 8:39 AM), http://blogs.roanoke.com/dancasey/2011/07/tuesdays-colu
mn-new-air-rifles-not-the-old-pea-shooters/.
147. See Fredrick Kunkle, Fairfax Backs Down on BB Guns, Passes Ordinance in Line
with General Assembly, VA. POL. BLOG (July 26, 2011, 12:19 PM), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/virginia-politics/post/fairfax-backs-down-on-bb-guns-passes-ordinance-in-
line-with-general-assembly/2011/07/26/gIQAeKrsalblog.html.
148. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 651, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-216.2, -216.8 (Cum. Supp. D).
149. Id.
150. H.B. 1339, Fiscal Impact Statement, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted
as Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 651, 2011 Va. Acts _J.
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The Act made changes in Virginia Code sections 8.01-261.3 and
8.01-263.8 to affect this waiver."5 ' The bill was enacted in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Ligon v.
County of Goochland, which relied upon the longstanding rule
that waivers of sovereign immunity must be express and clear.1 52
The court held that merely because the Commonwealth or a local
government is an "employer" does not mean that VFATA's liabili-
ties for "employers" under the Act apply to the Commonwealth or
a local government.' 53 This bill expressly supersedes this decision
and waives sovereign immunity in instances where government
employees suffered adverse employment decisions, because they
reported fraudulent activity in the workplace. While intended to
help the taxpayers, this bill may significantly increase claims
brought on behalf of disgruntled current and former government
employees and, with no cap on recovery as in the Virginia Tort
Claims Act,'5 4 could even cost the taxpayers more than the al-
leged fraud under certain circumstances.
2. Conforming the VFATA to the Federal False Claims Act:
Senate Bill 126215
This bill conforms the VFATA to the federal False Claims Act,
amended in 2010.116 This change is important, because any state
whose false claims statute matches the federal statute is entitled
to a bonus on Medicaid money."' This bill clarifies and expands
the definition of "claim" under the Act, introduces a materiality
requirement, adds "contractors and subcontractors" as protected
from retaliation, clarifies the procedure for Commonwealth to in-
tervene, allows the Commonwealth to prevent dismissal of a
claim under certain circumstances, allows information sharing
151. Ch. 651, 2011 Va. Acts _.
152. Ligon v. Cnty. of Goochland, 279 Va. 312, 317, 689 S.E.2d 666, 669 (2010).
153. Id. at 319, 689 S.E.2d at 670.
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011) (capping the lia-
bility of the Commonwealth, transportation district, or locality for damages in certain cas-
es).
155. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 676, 2011 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended and reenact-
ed at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-216.2, -216.3, -216.8, -216.9, -216.10, -216.17 (Cum. Supp.
2011)).
156. See Zachery Kitts, Two Major-and Historic-Events in the Past Seven Days . . . ,
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with a realtor under the Act, and extends the application of the
Act in many other ways.1s The Senate Bill 1262 amendments are
intended to make the VFATA more workable, clear, and con-
sistent with the federal False Claims Act.
D. Family Subdivisions: Senate Bill 873 15
This bill amends the family subdivision statute, Virginia Code
section 15.2-2244,160 to allow beneficiaries of a trust, who are all
family members as defined by the statute, to subdivide a parcel of
property held in trust for the purpose of selling or gifting the
property to family members.16 1 Any group of beneficiaries intend-
ing to subdivide property held in trust must meet the following
three requirements: (1) they must be immediate family members;
(2) there must be unanimous agreement to subdivide the proper-
ty; and (3) they must agree to place a restrictive covenant upon
the property preventing the sale of the property to a non-
immediate family member for fifteen years. 6 2 The statute also
gives the locality in which the property lies the ability to modify
any restrictive covenant created by the beneficiaries.16 3 This bill
recognizes that a family trust can be a preferred means to hold
title to family lands but that the family members may still desire
to utilize a family subdivision option.
158. Ch. 676, 2011 Va. Acts _.
159. Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 141, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2244.2 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2244(B)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2011). While automatically appli-
cable in many counties, these and other statutory family subdivision requirements are op-
tional or may be varied reasonably in counties having the urban county executive form of
government, those meeting certain growth requirements, or those proximate to other eli-
gible counties. See id.






1. More Restrictions on the Exercise of Eminent Domain: House
Bill 2161164 and Senate Bill 1436161
House Bill 2161 and Senate Bill 1436 are identical, and both
alter the existing law surrounding the government's ability to in-
voke eminent domain in Virginia, codified in title 25 of the Vir-
ginia Code. 1 6 There are several significant amendments. First,
the bills require a condemner to provide copies of "all appraisals
of the real property . .. that the state agency obtained prior to
making an offer to acquire."16' The previous version of the Code
only required that the condemner provide a copy of one apprais-
al.16 1 Second, the bills amend the Act by placing the definitions of
"appraisal" and "state agency" in the first section in order to
make them applicable to the entire statute."' Third, the bills
change the procedures necessary for the government to sell the
property back to the previous owner."o These situations occur
when the government's intended use for the property has not
been executed, or the government is stuck with a surplus of land
beyond what is necessary for a project.7 1 In these situations, the
government will be required to send an offer by registered mail to
the prior owner and publish the offer in a local newspaper for two
consecutive weeks.17 2 Fourth, the bills list what information is re-
quired for a valid publication."' Finally, the bills list parties that
are exempted from the statute including railroads, public service
corporations, municipal corporations, local government units, and
political subdivisions."' These amendments are the latest in a se-
164. H.B. 2161, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 15, 2011,
ch. 117, 2011 Va. Acts _).
165. S.B. 1436, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 15, 2011,
ch. 190, 2011 Va. Acts _).
166. Compare H.B. 2161, with S.B. 1436.
167. Acts of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 117, 190, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 25.1-100, -108, -204, -400, -410, -411, -414, -417 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-204(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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ries of restrictions on the exercise of eminent domain in the last
several years.
2. First Step to a Constitutional Amendment: House Joint
Resolution 69317'
House Joint Resolution 693 is the first adoption of a resolution
for a proposed amendment of the Virginia Constitution. If re-
adopted in the same form in 2012 and thereafter approved by
Virginia voters in a statewide referendum, the Virginia Constitu-
tion will be amended as provided in House Joint Resolution
693.176 This joint resolution contains some very significant limita-
tions to the government's rights to exercise eminent domain out-
lined in article I of the Virginia Constitution.
First, the proposed amendment would forbid the condemnation
of property "if the primary use is for private gain, private benefit,
private enterprise, increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or
economic development.""' This resolution may have serious ef-
fects on economic development within the commonwealth."' All
public improvement projects benefit someone economically, and
quite often, significant transportation or utility improvements are
needed to attract top prospects to the commonwealth, develop a
rural "greenfield," or redevelop an urban area."' Is the "primary
use" of a road or utility right of way under these circumstances to
attract "economic development" or to "increase jobs?"' This
amendment, if placed in the Virginia Constitution, may bar many
uses of eminent domain critical to the economic future of the
commonwealth and place the commonwealth at a competitive
disadvantage with other states.
Second, the proposed amendment would require compensation
for "lost profits" and "lost access" caused by the condemnation.-'
175. H.J. Res. 693, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011)).
176. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
177. H.J. Res. 693.
178. Virginia Municipal League Legislative Staff, General Assembly 2011: Temporary
Budget Cuts Look More Permanent Now, VA. TOWN & CITY, Mar. 2011, at 13 (discussing
how the new limit in the amendment would prohibit invoking eminent domain and raise







These terms will be defined later by the General Assembly but
would require the government to compensate landowners not only
for the fair market value of the take plus damages to the residue
(the current award in a condemnation case), 8 2 but also for "lost
profits" from business and "lost access" damages resulting from
the condemnation.'8 3 This is a new concept, heretofore uncompen-
sated, and will likely cause appraisals to differ widely depending
upon the appraiser's view of: (i) what exactly caused the "lost
profits," and (ii) how much the "lost access" really damaged the
landowner.1 8 4 If placed in the Virginia Constitution, this amend-
ment will certainly have the effect of driving up the cost of needed
public projects, often delaying or eliminating them entirely.
F. Zoning Order, Requirement, Decision, or Determination:
House Bill 1844.
This bill requires that landowners be notified when third par-
ties apply for a written order, requirement, decision, or determi-
nation from the zoning administrator regarding their property. 8 6
The bill requires that the zoning administrator or the applicant
give written notice to a landowner within ten days of the applica-
tion."' This notice requirement is satisfied by written notice via
mail to the landowner's address listed in the tax assessment
books.' 8 Without this notice, a board of zoning appeals decision
on an appeal of a zoning administrator order, requirement, deci-
sion, or determination is not binding on the landowner.'"' With-
out a similar written notice, a decision by the governing body on
an appeal of an interpretation of a proffer under Virginia Code
section 15.2-2299 is also not binding on the landowner.'9" This bill
is intended to ensure that landowners know of zoning applica-
182. See, e.g., Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Glass, 270 Va. 138, 145-47, 155, 613
S.E.2d 411, 415-16, 421 (2005) (calculating compensation in a condemnation case).
183. H.J. Res. 693.
184. See Virginia Municipal League Legislative Staff, supra note 178.
185. Act of Mar. 24, 2011, ch. 457, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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tions affecting their property and have a more obvious opportuni-
ty to participate.
G. Tax Assessment Appeals: House Bill 1588191 and Senate Bill
1350192
Effective beginning in tax year 2012, these identical bills
amend the provisions of Virginia Code sections 58.1-3331 (access
to certain assessment records), 58.1-3379 (board of equalization
appeals), and 58.1-3984 (circuit court tax assessment appeals) in
three primary ways.19 3
First, notices of the appealing taxpayer's rights to documents
are now required, and the bills set forth the form, timing, and
means for such notices.19 4 Second, in all real property tax appeals
at a board of equalization or circuit court, proof of the taxpayer's
case now requires a statutory "preponderance of the evidence"
standard9 5 rather than the common law "clear preponderance"
standard previously required.1 96 Third, for appeals involving an
"assessment of residential property filed by a taxpayer as an
owner of real property containing less than four residential
units," if the assessing official fails to provide the notices refer-
enced above, or fails to timely produce the assessment documents
referenced in the notices, there is a shift in the order of presenta-
tion of evidence at the board of equalization and in circuit
court."' If this shift occurs, the assessing official is required to
191. H.B. 1588, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 18, 2011,
ch. 232, 2011 Va. Acts _).
192. S.B. 1350, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 15, 2011,
ch. 184, 2011 Va. Acts J.
193. See Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 232, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of VA. CODE ANN. tit. 58.1 (Cum. Supp. 2011)); Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 184,
2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended in scattered sections of VA. CODE ANN. tit. 58.1
(Cum. Supp. 2011)).
194. See Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 232, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended in VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3379; codified at id. § 58.1-3331(E) (Cum. Supp. 2011)); Act of Mar. 15,
2011, ch. 184, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended in VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3379; codi-
fied at id. § 58.1-3331(E) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
195. See Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 232, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified at as amended in VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984; codified at id. (Cum. Supp. 2011)); Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 184,
2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended in VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984; codified at id. (Cum.
Supp. 2011)).
196. See, e.g., West Creek, 276 Va. at 409, 665 S.E.2d at 842-43 (explaining the common
law "clear preponderance" standard).
197. See Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 232, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified at as amended in VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984; codified at id. (Cum. Supp. 2011)); Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 184,
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present certain basic information as to how the assessment was
prepared and how it conforms with certain assessment stand-
ards."' Thereafter, the case proceeds as any other real property
assessment appeal.
These bills were introduced in response to concerns that indi-
vidual landowners were overmatched by the assessor at the board
of equalization (H.B. 1588) and to adjust the burden on taxpayers
in circuit court (S.B. 1350).199 As conformed to each other and
adopted, these bills alter well-settled law to introduce new proce-
dures, requirements, and perhaps a shift in the presentation of
evidence. The bills do not appear to eliminate the common law
requirement for the taxpayer/plaintiff to prove "manifest error,"
as this longstanding requirement arises from the presumption of
correctness of the assessment, a separation of powers concern,
and unamended statutory text. However, the extent to which the
law of assessment appeals has truly been altered will only be
known after years of litigation.
H. Agricultural and Forestal Districts: House Bill 2078200
This bill amends various sections in title 15.2 of the Virginia
Code that deal with the Agricultural and Forestal District Act.20 1
The bill formally creates the role of local program administrator,
appointed by the governing body, and streamlines procedures,
eliminates duplicative steps, and broadens some eligibility re-
quirements.2 0 2 Under this bill, the program administrator (rather
than the governing body) is the first step in the creation of dis-
tricts, as well as additions to or deletions from existing dis-
2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended in VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984; codified at id. (Cum.
Supp. 2011)).
198. See Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 232, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified at as amended in VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984; codified at id. (Cum. Supp. 2011)); Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 184,
2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended in VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984; codified at id. (Cum.
Supp. 2011)).
199. Andrew McRoberts, Tax Assessment Appeals Affected-How Much? (Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly 2011), VA. LOCALITY LAW (Mar. 2, 2011, 6:14 PM), http://valocality law.com/
2011/03/02/tax-assessment-appeals-affected-how-much-virginia-general-assembly-2011/.
200. Act of Mar. 22, 2011, ch. 344, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended in scattered
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tricts. 20 3 The process of creating new districts and adding or re-
moving parcels is shorter and simpler. As amended, an applica-
tion goes from the administrative level (program administrator),
through the Agricultural and Forestal Districts Advisory Com-
mittee, to the planning commission for a public hearing, and fi-
nally to the governing body for another public hearing.20 4 Previ-
ously, applications went to each public body twice, starting at the
governing body, then down the line to the advisory committee, be-
fore reversing course and ending at the governing body.2 05 Under
this bill, the governing body may further simplify the process by
allowing the planning commission to act in lieu of the Agricultur-
al and Forestal Districts Advisory Committee if the commission
contains at least four landowners engaged in agricultural or for-
estal production.2 0 6 Finally, the bill allows the locality to select
which maps or aerial photographs accompany the application.2 0 7
This bill makes the application for and administration of agricul-
tural and forestal districts far simpler, and therefore encourages
them.
IV. CONCLUSION
The past year has been a significant one for Virginia local gov-
ernment law. For Virginia's local governments, their officials and
attorneys, the Supreme Court of Virginia offered some needed
guidance and wins that seemed offset by losses. The General As-
sembly clarified or simplified some statutes governing local gov-
ernment but also reversed results in court favorable to local gov-
ernment, favored individual rights, and in many cases made the
business of local government more expensive for local taxpayers.
We will see what the coming year of 2011 through 2012 has in
store.
203. Compare Act of Mar. 22, 2011, ch. 344, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-4307 (Cum. Supp. 2011) (referring to program administrators), with
id. § 15.2-4307 (Repl. Vol. 2008) (referring to the local governing body).
204. Ch. 344, 2011 Va. Acts _.
205. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-4307 to -4309 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
206. Ch. 344, 2011 Va. Acts .
207. See id.
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